


WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 19 February 1972

25X1




Top Secret

NSA review completed

SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1972
Weekly average for each month




NOVEMBER 1971 - FEBRUARY 1972









Weekly data as reported

US BATTLE DEATHS



dropped to 1 from the 2 reported last week.

**SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS**

decreased markedly from last week's 217 to 139. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.

**SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS**

as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces, decreased from last week's 97% to 91%.



Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary



25X1

Enemy Activity

25X1

25X1 The overall level of enemy activity in South Vietnam has remained fairly low, although toward the end of the week there was a moderate upsurge of action which coincided with President Nixon's arrival in Peking. In general, the Communists have not yet used their main force units to strike at Allied installations in any real strength.

25X1

[redacted] North Vietnamese main force units may launch widespread offensive actions in that area within the very near future. Also, the Communists are continuing to build up their forces, particularly near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), where elements of two North Vietnamese Army (NVA) divisions are now [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] inside South Vietnam. Units of one of these divisions are positioned at a point where they can move into Thua Thien Province very quickly. In the western highlands of MR 2, a major North Vietnamese artillery command element has recently been detected moving into a position from which it can coordinate and direct the use of long range artillery recently introduced into the western highlands.

25X1 Throughout western MR 2, enemy units appear to have completed final preparations for offensive activity, though so far these forces have generally avoided combat. The situation in MR 3 remains quiet, but there are indications that the Communists are now moving some forces toward this part of South Vietnam from Cambodian base areas. The delta region of MR 4 witnessed several sharp local actions during the week, but as yet no widespread or coordinated enemy attacks have occurred.

In north Laos, General Vang Pao's 5,000-man irregular operation, designed to draw enemy forces out of the Long Tieng area, has begun to lose momentum after meeting stiffening enemy resistance. The enemy appears determined to keep friendly forces out of his base areas and lines of communications in the eastern part of the Plaine des Jarres (PDJ). Vang Pao seems to have achieved his objective of buying time for the defense of Long Tieng, however, since major elements of three and possibly four enemy regiments have been drawn away from the Long Tieng/Sam Thong sector to counter the irregular forces now operating south and southeast of the Plaine. (It should be noted that at least an equal number of Communist regiments remain in the immediate Long Tieng area, but the position of the defenders there has nonetheless clearly improved.) Further to the north, Pathet Lao troops in western Sayaboury Province increased their pressure on irregular forces and succeeded in capturing two more small, friendly positions on 16 February. In south Laos, NVA units have forced friendly troops to give more ground west of Dong Hene and have rocketed and harassed the town of Seno. Enemy activity in the Bolovens Plateau area has subsided, and government forces continue to consolidate their still precarious front line positions, now less than 11 miles east of Pakse along Route 23.

There was a slight increase of enemy-initiated activity in Cambodia during the week, consisting mostly of stand-off attacks by fire. A four-battalion government clearing operation west of Phnom Penh has encountered only minor enemy resistance, indicating that there are few enemy forces in the area. While the Communists clearly have the capability to rocket the capital and to conduct sabotage and terrorist activities within its confines, they are not now in a position to launch a main force attack on the city.

Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

The estimate of infiltrators destined for South Vietnam and Cambodia since 1 October 1971 rose sharply to some 86,800 - 88,800 with the acceptance of 10,590 additional personnel during the week. In addition, elements of the 325th NVA Division may be preparing to return to southern North Vietnam from Hanoi, where the entire division has been stationed for the past year. Such a deployment could free other enemy infantry units currently in the DMZ area for combat in South Vietnam. The Communists are also maintaining a high level of logistics activity to support their forces in the south. Shipments of ammunition for heavy artillery are still being made toward the DMZ, and logistics units in the tri-border area continue to funnel relatively large volumes of materiel both toward the western highlands of MR 2 and southward to Cambodia.